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Introduction: Nation-building and state failure
The purpose of nation-building is the prevention of state failure. This agenda 
requires one to define what one regards as the main tasks of the state. Rotberg 
(2004: 3) provides a convenient starting point: “The state’s prime function is to 
provide that political good of security – to prevent cross-border invasions and 
infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate threats to or attacks upon the 
national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to 
domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with 
the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms 
of political coercion.” The state cannot fulfill its functions without capable and 
reasonably honest administrations, courts, and police. Otherwise, law and order 
are inconceivable. In essence, state failure refers to the absence of a monopoly 
of legitimate violence, to warring factions challenging each other and those who 
claim to constitute the government without, however, being capable to govern. 
Correlates – and in some instances, possibly, determinants – of state failure are 
low levels of per capita income and high levels of infant mortality, closure to in-
ternational trade, and lack of democracy (Rotberg 2004: 21). Nation-building thus 
requires establishing or restoring political stability, or, better still, the rule of law 
and providing the requisites of a prospering economy. This is a tall order. 
Moreover, the literature and the political debate refer to nation-building rather 
than merely to state-building. This seems to imply the idea that some degree of 
identification with all of one’s compatriots or fellow citizens, with the nation, is a 
prerequisite for successful state-building.1 Wherever the degree of racial, ethnic, 
or even religious homogeneity within a society is low, people might identify with 
members of their own subgroup rather than with all of their compatriots. Then 
voluntary contributions to the provision of public goods, including public order 
and political stability, become even less likely than they ordinarily are.2 By con-
trast to state-building, nation-building is an even taller order: It requires that the 
primary focus of identification is transferred from local or regional, from ethnic 
or religious communities to the national level. 
1 Possibly, such national we-feeling, patriotism, or nationalism even contributes to economic 
growth (Greenfeld 2001). The best contemporary illustrations for this view can be found in East 
Asia: Japan, South Korea, China, and Vietnam.
2 Based on data collected within the United States, Putnam (2007) found that trust and other 
measures of social integration are lower in ethnically diverse than in homogeneous neighbour-
hoods. Based on a review of 20th century history with special emphasis on war and civil war, 
on genocide and mass murder, Ferguson (2007) argues that ethnic heterogeneity is one out of 
three major determinants of these calamities. 
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There are two types of actors who are interested in nation-building: first, those 
who aspire to govern nations or ‘should be’-nations, and second, others who fear 
the spill-over from state-failure. By now, it is fairly well established that state 
failure and underdevelopment constitute a vicious circle where civil war and state 
failure contribute to economic stagnation and decline, where worsening poverty 
makes the establishment of political stability ever more difficult (Collier 2007). 
Worse still, even neighboring countries are affected by state failure. Neither re-
fugees, nor marauding soldiers, nor contagious diseases respect international 
borders. As the case of Afghanistan (which has been a failed state at least since 
the retreat of Soviet troops) illustrates, state failure even may permit terrorist 
organizations with a global reach, such as al-Qaeda, to establish training camps 
for terrorists. Pakistan, where the state has failed to establish permanent control 
in areas such as Baluchistan or Waziristan, illustrates the same point.
Although poverty and terrorist activity seem unrelated at the individual le-
vel of analysis, whatever their class, ethnic or educational background may be, 
terrorists do assemble and train in failed states, as many al-Qaeda warriors did 
in Afghanistan. Since September 11, 2001, failed states within the Muslim world 
are therefore perceived as training camps and bases for the global export of ter-
ror and violence. The consequences of this postulated relationship between state 
failure in the Muslim world and the export of terrorism are awe-inspiring: The 
rich countries of the West in general and the United States as the sole remaining 
superpower in particular are saddled with responsibility, or at least co-respon-
sibility, for the avoidance of state-failure by nation-building everywhere on the 
globe, and in the Muslim world in particular. Whether one wants to call this self-
imposed policy burden ‘imperialism’, is a matter of definition.3 Certainly, global 
nation-building is not easier than classical colonialism. The Bush presidency has 
made an enormously demanding job even more difficult by aiming at the demo-
cratization rather than merely stabilization of the target states of its recent mi-
litary interventions, Afghanistan and Iraq.4 
3 Since I am a nominalist (like Popper), I regard all definitions as ultimately arbitrary names. 
They are mere abbreviations and conventions. As has been argued elsewhere (Lieber 2005; 
Mandelbaum 2005; Weede 2006b), the United States comes closer to serving as a substitute for 
world government than the United Nations. Capability is even more important than legitimacy. 
As Huntington (1968: 5) has observed in a different context: “Authority has to exist before it 
can be limited.” As Tullock (1974) has argued, the establishment of government by consent, 
contract, and democracy has always been less likely than the establishment of government by 
force or conquest. 
4 The best defence of Bush’s policies is Podhoretz’ (2007) recent book on World War IV. He perceives 
four pillars of the Bush doctrine which may be abbreviated as 1. democratization or ‘draining 
the swamp’ of Islamist terrorism, 2. holding foreign governments responsible for providing ter-
rorists with bases (Afghanistan), 3. pre-emption against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
	 Nation-Building	in	the	Middle	East:	The	new	Imperialism?	 
Not all dictatorships or police states are unstable. Not all of them are exporters 
of political instability or terrorism. As Etzioni (2007: XIII) has pointed out, their 
removal might well promote regional instability or state failure: “The sudden re-
moval of the police state in such nations – whether the former U.S.S.R., post-Ta-
liban Afghanistan, or in Post-Saddam Iraq – tends to bring with it an explosive 
growth of antisocial behavior, in the form of murders, drug abuse, rape, and kid-
napping.” Irrespective of good intentions, it is always conceivable to make a bad 
situation even worse.5
Obstacles to Successful Nation-Building: 
Lessons from Abstract Theories
Nation-building is not a process of social evolution, but it is an exercise in grand-
scale planning. That is why one should consider whether some of the standard 
arguments against central planning in economies are applicable against state- or 
nation-building, whether they contain some warnings for the political planners.
First, there is the problem of knowledge. According to Payne (2006a: 606), “no 
one knows how to do it.” Certainly, the Bush Administration has not proved Payne 
wrong in Afghanistan or Iraq. According to Hayek (1960), knowledge is scattered 
across millions of heads. Not all of it is academic or at least explicit and easily 
verbalized. Some bits of it are tacit. Some bits of it are local and not easily ap-
plicable elsewhere or under different circumstances. Some bits are contained in 
traditions or institutions. It is impossible to centralize the knowledge of a society. 
If an administration attempts to do so, as Soviet-type planning agencies attempted 
to do, then a lot of knowledge is lost or wasted. Since nation-building includes 
overcoming abject poverty and underdevelopment, and has to do so because of 
the aforementioned vicious circle linking underdevelopment and political instabi-
lity,6 Hayek’s classical argument about the cognitive limitations for planning fully 
applies to nation-building which includes economic development, but demands 
even more: the establishment of trust and social integration, securing the rule of 
law, political freedom and stability. 
destruction to sympathisers of terrorists (Iraq), 4. insistence on choosing between them (the 
terrorists and their allies) and us (the US or the West). 
5 This is the typical outcome of social revolutions (Weede and Muller 1997). Certainly, the 
Communists succeeded in making bad situations even worse – almost everywhere where they 
gained power. 
6 For recent quantitative or econometric evidence on the relationship between low levels of 
economic development or poverty on the one hand and political instability on the other hand, 
see, for example, Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; Henderson and Singer 2000; Lujala, 
Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005.
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Second, there is the problem of agency. Whether one regards some poor country 
government – say in Afghanistan or Iraq – or the US government as the ultimate 
principal, execution on the ground depends on local agents or officials. This raises 
the question whether there are sufficient incentives for agents to do what they are 
told to do. Wherever nation-building is deemed essential – nobody has demanded 
yet doing it in Britain or Switzerland – the social environment is likely to be cha-
racterized by poverty and insecurity, even for officials. Under such circumstances 
taking bribes as well as shirking wherever the execution of one’s duty becomes dan-
gerous should be expected. Can one seriously blame local policemen in the Afghan 
countryside, if they put survival and feeding their children ahead of Bush’s desires 
or Karzai’s orders? Controlling deviant agent behavior should become the more dif-
ficult, the longer the chain of command becomes. If there is a cultural or linguistic 
gap between the principal and his agents, then the task of agent control becomes 
even more formidable. This applies already to the president of Afghanistan and many 
of his field agents in valleys, mountains or deserts. It is hard to imagine, how agent 
control from Washington or NATO headquarters might work out satisfactorily.7 
Third, given information and agency problems mistakes should frequently hap-
pen. Thus, an error correction mechanism is required. How does it look like? How 
could it look like? Within competitive economies, big errors are corrected almost 
automatically. If an enterprise produces expensive low-quality products, then 
nobody will buy them. If the enterprise persists in producing what nobody wants, 
then bankruptcy becomes unavoidable. Within centrally planned economies, this 
mechanism never existed. That is why they could engage in comparative-advan-
tage denying strategies for decades (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003). 
Since governments and bureaucracies are organized hierarchically rather than 
competitively, since government offices or departments are almost never disban-
ded after failure in meeting their objectives, weeding out errors seems to require 
insights and orders from the top decision-maker. From social psychology (de Rivera 
1968) as well as from centrally planned economies (Winiecki 1988) we know that 
underlings or agents do not like to tell superiors or principals about failures. So, 
the ultimate decision-maker is unlikely to be well-informed early. Moreover, being 
powerful is not necessarily the best learning environment. Power implies that one 
can resist revising one’s view of the world. Deutsch (1968: 124) once suggested 
that politics might obey the ”law of least mental effort”. 
7 Moreover, Huntington (1996) has argued that interference in different civilizations is fraught 
with special risks. Thus, the prophet of ‘the clash of civilizations’ was more circumspect in his 
policy recommendations than the Bush Administration was in the execution of its policies.
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Fourth, there is a modified economic model of man (Caplan 2007) whose in-
sights might be transferred from voting and political behavior within the Uni-
ted States to the problem at hand. Caplan’s basic idea is simple. The traditional 
economic model of man – according to which human beings are self-seeking 
utility-maximizers – is applicable only under special circumstances. According 
to Caplan, this model applies only where people themselves suffer the conse-
quences of their actions.8 Under such circumstances humans want to learn about 
the likely consequences of their actions. Such learning is a prerequisite of ratio-
nal decision-making. Elsewhere humans stick with emotionally satisfying beliefs, 
like blaming foreigners for all kinds of problems, and do not even care enough 
to become self-seeking. Instead a combination of irrationality and superficial or 
rhetorical altruism prevails. 
Caplan’s argument should be combined with Popper’s (1959) who points out 
that falsification is even more important than verification. This highlights the 
importance of negative feedback. Caplan’s argument about the background con-
ditions of rationality underlines the necessity of feedback and consequences for 
oneself. Negative feedback might be the most important part of it. Unfortunately, 
Caplan is right in showing that politics is a sphere of life where the consequences 
of one’s action for oneself are frequently diluted by the consequences of the ac-
tions of others, where one’s own actions more frequently contribute to damage 
to a multitude of others than to oneself. One tends to be the victim of similar 
actions by others. Although this argument is best developed for voting in mass 
democracies, it can be generalized. That is why rational or maximizing behavior 
should not be expected in politics or international affairs. 
Fifth, if skepticism about political decision-making in general and the feasi-
bility of nation-building in particular is justified, then there should be testable 
implications. Foreign aid is one tool of nation-building. Since it is a non-lethal 
one in contrast to military intervention, it enjoys some degree of popularity among 
ruling elites in rich countries. From the perspective of Caplan’s theory about the 
background conditions of self-seeking rationality on the one hand and cognitively 
superficial altruism on the other hand, one should not be surprised to find that 
econometric studies (for references and details see Easterly 2006 or Wolff 2005) 
by and large do not support the proposition that aid promotes growth. Since ru-
ling elites do not spend their own money, since they do not starve if the inten-
8 Hayek’s (1960) insistence on coupling individual liberty with responsibility is a forerunner 
of some of Caplan’s views. Certainly, these views are consistent with each other in rejecting 
the neo-classical cult of rational decision-making and the belief in its applicability under all 
circumstances.
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ded beneficiaries do not get it, nobody should expect much political interest in 
cost-benefit analyses. Nor should one expect that foreign aid is eliminated merely 
because its effectiveness cannot be demonstrated. For most politicians it seems 
more important to demonstrate that they care about poverty than to insist on 
effectiveness in doing good with the taxpayer’s money. 
Sixth, we can learn something from Western history about stages or phases 
of nation-building. Of course, Western histories of nation-building differ. Nati-
on-states were established earlier in Britain or France than in Germany or Italy. 
Democracy evolved slowly in Britain, by revolutionary change in France, after 
military defeat in Germany or Italy. Stepwise development in Britain was not in-
terrupted by phases of regression, as we can observe in Continental Europe.  The 
sequence of establishing national identity, the rule of law, representative or ac-
countable government, and mass franchise seems to matter. Important political 
theorists (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1968; Nordlinger 1971; Rustow 1996) agree 
that establishing national identity first, the rule of law and accountable govern-
ment second, and the mass franchise last is the best sequence if one is to avoid 
political instability and civil war or external war involvement. In applying this 
lesson to poor and unstable developing countries, one observation might be that 
the process of state-building requires time, that forcing the process is dangerous 
and unlikely to succeed. There can be no democracy without restraint in using 
violence for political purposes. Another observation is that democratization is 
more likely to succeed, if widening the franchise is the final step rather the first 
step in political development or nation-building. Widening the franchise actually 
might lead to some reassertion of violence as a tool of political competition and 
thereby endanger democratization (Payne 2005). 
Seventh, there is even some quantitative evidence that stable and mutual-
ly recognized borders contribute not only to the avoidance of war, but also to 
the establishment of democracy (Gibler 2007). Afghanistan never recognized its 
border with Pakistan which was imposed by the British after one of their Afghan 
wars when they still ruled India, including what today is Pakistan. Moreover, to 
this day no government on either side of the border was ever capable of effec-
tively policing it. Concerning the general recognition of Iraq’s borders, it suffices 
to remember that Saddam Hussein waged two wars of aggression against neigh-
boring countries (Iran and Kuwait) in order to acquire territory since 1980, and 
a bloody counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurds seeking autonomy or, 
possibly, even secession.
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Eighth, there is a close relationship between state-building and military or-
ganization (Andreski 1968; Tilly 1990). Many former colonies acquired indepen-
dence before they developed autonomous military organizations. Since native 
political power frequently was a gift from former colonizers rather than resul-
ting from conquest or a successful war of independence, monopolies of violence 
didn’t exist there or were easily challenged by non-state actors. Both foreign aid 
and military intervention in favor of some governments may simultaneously help 
weak governments to survive, but to remain weak. Is there an alternative to the 
perpetuation of weak government? 
The conceivable alternative to America and the West supporting weak govern-
ments is gruesome. It is to “give war a chance”. Luttwak (1999: 36) has spelled 
out the logic of this recommendation: “(…) although war is a great evil, it does 
have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. This can 
happen when all belligerents become exhausted or when one wins decisively. Eit-
her way the key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. 
War brings peace only after a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military 
success must fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further 
combat.” Luttwak’s ‘peace by exhaustion’9 should apply equally to civil and inter-
national wars. Those who recoil from the supposed moral cynicism of this policy 
recommendation should ask themselves whether Western democracies have the 
will, the stamina, and the capability to impose their vision of a just political or-
der by military force.10 
According to Payne’s (2006a) study of 51 Anglo-American interventions, only 
about a quarter of them seem to have succeeded. Even in the American backyard, 
in Central America and the Caribbean, failure has been the rule and success has 
been the exception. The US and its allies did not succeed in Indochina during the 
1970s when Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam where abandoned to the Com-
munists who established a reign of terror everywhere and exterminated possibly 
a quarter or third of the population in Cambodia (Rummel 1994). The Reagan ad-
ministration withdrew from Lebanon in the 1980s, and the Clinton administration 
9 Since Luttwak (1999) wrote his paper before September 11, 2001, and much before the second 
Iraq War, one may ask whether he really would welcome an American withdrawal from Iraq. 
His later papers (Luttwak 2005, 2007) clearly say that he recommends a withdrawal. 
10 For a similar view, see Fearon (2007: 8): “civil wars typically conclude with a decisive military 
victory for one side. Of the roughly 55 civil wars fought for control of a central government 
(as opposed to for secession or regional autonomy) since 1955, fully 75 percent ended with a 
clear victory for one side.” In Iraq, ending the civil war by a power-sharing agreement between 
Shias, Sunnis and Kurds runs into the obstacle that Sunnis and Shias are insufficiently cohesive 
to strike binding deals.
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from Somalia in the 1990s. It is hard to avoid the prediction that the Americans 
and their ‘coalitions of the willing’ will leave Iraq to a tragic fate soon and, pos-
sibly, even Afghanistan somewhat later. If the West ultimately let wars burn and 
terror rule, why not admit our impotence from the beginning?
Seen from a neoconservative perspective, these skeptical observations about 
American or Western interventionism have an admittedly ‘isolationist’ or even ‘defe-
atist’ flavour.11 They point to difficulties. They argue that success in nation-building 
is unlikely. If one adds an insistence on democracy rather ‘merely’ political stability, 
then the job gets even tougher. Although the relationship is not deterministic, as 
India illustrates best, by and large economic development and high average in-
comes come close to being prerequisites of democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 
1994; Lipset 1994).  Since prosperity usually results from long periods of econo-
mic growth, one faces the question how to promote growth in poor countries. As 
already said above, economic aid does not seem to be the answer (Easterly 2006; 
Wolff 2005).12 Econometric studies disagree among themselves about the proper 
specification of growth equations, and frequently include regional dummy variables 
(which might be useful in getting more precise estimates of the impact of explicitly 
included determinants of growth, but) which are not easily interpretable (Bleany 
and Nishiyama 2002; Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller 2004). 
Although economic freedom does promote growth (Doucouliagos and Uluba-
soglu 2006; Weede 2006a), there seem to be only two very strong determinants 
of growth: potential advantages of backwardness and human capital endowment. 
Human capital effects are best operationalized by intelligence quotients (Garrett 
and Schneider 2006; Weede 2006a). Although this operationalization by no means 
implies that nothing can be done to raise them, one certainly should not expect 
short-run miracles.
The potential advantages of backwardness refer to the fact that backward 
economies can grow more rapidly than highly developed economies. Advantages 
of backwardness refer to opportunities which can be wasted, and have been 
wasted in Africa or even in China under Mao or in India at least until the 1980s. 
11 The non-interventionism or ‘isolationism’ reluctantly accepted here is not the classical American 
isolationism which advocated a retreat to the Western hemisphere. Instead, ‘isolation’ or better: 
‘military non-intervention’  here refers to the relationship between the rich countries of the 
West and those parts of the underdeveloped world which remain mired in stagnation, poverty 
and political instability, as much of the Muslim world does. 
12 Easterly’s (2001) earlier book justifies even deeper pessimism. There he discusses the limitations 
of our knowledge on the sources of growth. In particular, he argues against expecting miracles 
from more investment in poor countries.
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Although there are a number of reasons for this effect, the ability of backward 
economies to borrow technology from more advanced ones is probably the major 
reason for this effect. One may even argue (Weede 2006a) that the advantages 
of backwardness are a kind of spill-over effect from earlier economic freedom 
and prosperity in the West to still poor countries now. Then, the task of the West 
vis-à-vis the third world is not to assist in nation-building, nor to provide eco-
nomic aid, but to provide technologies for poor countries to imitate, to provide 
open markets for their exports, and to provide an example of economic freedom, 
prosperity, political stability, and ultimately even democracy. 
The Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq13
There is room for debate whether Afghanistan was still a failed state under the 
Taliban, or whether the regime was on the way towards consolidation. Certainly, 
the country was no democracy, and the Taliban governed inhumanely. Moreover, 
they provided a base and training camps for al-Qaeda which is why the Americans 
felt the necessity to intervene after September 11, 2001. 
Strictly speaking, Iraq was not a failed state before the American invasion in 
2003. Saddam ruled inhumanely, but effectively. He had murdered enough of his 
opponents and lots of innocent bystanders, in particular Kurds and Shias, to force 
the population of Iraq into submission. Under Saddam Hussein repression wor-
ked. By defeating him and by the early attempt to replace most of the previously 
ruling class, the Americans effectively turned Iraq into a failed state. Of course, 
the American policy goal was something different and better. 
But how likely was the establishment of a democracy in Afghanistan or Iraq 
before the Americans ran into the current predicament? The quantitative evidence 
most of which was available before the invasion even began should have made 
one pessimistic. By general agreement, the prospects of democracy are much wor-
se in poor than in rich countries (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Lipset 1994). 
Afghanistan has been one of the poorest counties of the world for decades. Iraq 
is also poor. Neither Saddam Hussein’s rule nor his wars, including Bush’s war 
deposing him, made the country any richer.14 The best hope for Iraq to become 
13 This section of the paper builds on previously published papers (Weede 2006b, 2007). 
14 It has been claimed (Podhoretz 2006: 26) that per capita income in Iraq is already 30% higher 
than it was before the war, and that growth prospects look good in spite of the insurgency. 
This modest prosperity seems to depend on the American taxpayer picking up the security bill. 
One may doubt whether this type of prosperity – irrespective of its degree – is conducive to 
democracy.
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richer depends on its natural resources, its oil. Unfortunately, such resources can 
be a curse. The prospects for democracy or even political stability in resource rich 
countries are worse than elsewhere (Ross 2001, 2004; Weiffen 2004). A plausible 
reason for this failure is that ruling elites can live comfortably because of resource 
rents in an otherwise underdeveloped country, if it is well enough endowed with 
natural resources. 
Finally, the cultural characteristics of Afghanistan and Iraq provide few rea-
sons for hope. Both are Muslim countries. Iraq is a mostly Arab country. Although 
there is some debate whether belonging to Muslim civilization or merely belon-
ging to the Arab family of nations makes a nation less likely to respect human 
rights or to become democratic (de Soysa and Nordas 2005; Donno and Russett 
2004; Weiffen 2004), the details of this debate do not matter much for the pur-
poses at hand. Whether it is because of its largely Arab or its Muslim character, 
the prospects for democracy look poor in Iraq. Because of its abject poverty and 
the rough terrain favoring insurgents (Fearon and Laitin 2003), the prospects in 
Afghanistan are bad, too.
The projects of democratization in Afghanistan and Iraq run into further com-
plications because of the communal tensions across ethnic and sectarian divides:15 
between Pashto-speaking Pathans, Dari-speaking Tajiks, Uzbeks (all of the former 
being mostly Sunni) and Shia Hazara in Afghanistan; between Arabs and Kurds, 
between Sunnis in the Middle and the West and Shias in the South of Iraq. Whether 
majority rule is applicable in Afghanistan is dubious. Straightforward application 
of the majority principle promises Shia rule for ever in Iraq. In Afghanistan regi-
onalism tends to degenerate into war-lord rule. Some devolution of power to the 
regional level might pacify the Kurds, but does not look appealing to the Sunnis 
whose area does not include a significant number of oil wells and who look back 
to a long period when they ruled Iraq. Since Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Arabs 
feel threatened by each other, one may argue that democratization presupposes 
the solution of another difficult problem. 
15 It has been claimed (Podhoretz 2006: 26) that per capita income in Iraq is already 30% higher 
than it was before the war, and that growth prospects look good in spite of the insurgency. 
This modest prosperity seems to depend on the American taxpayer picking up the security bill. 
One may doubt whether this type of prosperity – irrespective of its degree – is conducive to 
democracy.
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In Biddle’s (2006: 13) words: “Resolving the country’s communal security pro-
blems must take priority over bringing self-determination to the Iraqi people - or 
the democracy that many hope for will never emerge.” Similarly, Etzioni (2007: 
1) has advocated a change of American priorities from democracy to security and 
pointed out “that all people have an interest in and right to security, understood 
to include freedom from deadly violence, maiming, and torture. (…) this right is 
more fundamental than all the others, including legal-political and socioeconomic 
rights.”  As argued above, however, even an ‘imperial’ policy of exporting ‘merely’ 
political stability and security might be overambitious and prove to be beyond 
the capabilities of the US or even the West. 
National identity in Afghanistan and Iraq is precarious: Uzbeks or Tajiks are 
not even Pashto-speakers. Kurds are not Arabs. Saddam Hussein was not the only 
Sunni Arab who dreamed of unifying Arabs far beyond Iraq’s borders. The rule of 
law has never existed in Afghanistan or Iraq. Its institutionalization takes time, 
almost certainly longer than a single decade. Thus, the institutional back-up of 
any Afghan or Iraqi democracy must remain weak for some time to come. Semi-
democratic regimes or emerging democracies, however, are at risk of domestic 
conflict or interstate war involvement (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 
2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2005). There is some evidence that the beneficial 
effects of democratization are largely confined to mature and liberal democra-
cies, i.e., to a type of democracy which needs decades to be established (Zakaria 
2003). Fukuyama (2005: 29-30) even suggested “that more democracy and more 
modernization will not solve our near-term terrorism problem, but may well ex-
acerbate it.” Mansfield and Snyder (2005: 230) provided another warning: “Trying 
and failing to democratize in adverse circumstances can have fateful, long-term 
consequences.” Unfortunately, less than complete democratic transitions happen 
to be more frequent than fully successful ones (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 80-81, 
175). Afghanistan’s or Iraq’s characteristics have never destined these countries 
to be among the rare and immediately successful cases of democratization. 
In the late 1940s, most Western observers would have been pessimistic about 
the democratic prospects of Germany or Japan. With the benefit of hindsight we 
know that pessimism was misplaced. Why? Both countries still had the human 
capital and much of the infrastructure of a developed country. They had the po-
tential to become rich countries. Soon, they succeeded. They did not suffer from 
the distortions of resource-rich countries. They were neither Arab nor Muslim 
countries which seem to provide the least fertile soil for efforts at democratiza-
tion. Moreover, people in both countries found a persuasive reason to collaborate 
with the United States. Especially in Germany, most people regarded Communism 
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and the Soviet Union as much worse than the United States and democracy.16 
Thus, the Soviet threat provided a basis for collaboration between the US and 
should-be democrats in Germany and Japan (Edelstein 2004). Since the demise 
of Communism and the Soviet Union, no common enemy exists against whom 
American democrats, Afghan or Arab nationalists and fervent believers in a radical 
interpretation of Islam can cooperate. This is another reason why repeating the 
democratic reeducation success is unlikely in Afghanistan or Iraq. By contrast to 
Afghanistan or Iraq, Germany also enjoyed an indigenous tradition of the rule of 
law which was interrupted only by Hitler. Nevertheless, it provided something to 
which one could return. 
An implicit assumption of American advocates of democratization seems to 
be that democratically elected governments are likely to be friends of the Uni-
ted States. The Muslim world is the region where this hope looks least plausible. 
Muslim fundamentalists can win elections because of their devotion and vitality, 
their honesty and relative immunity to corruption, or even their readiness to inti-
midate rivals (Pipes 2005-2006). It is hard, however, to imagine a fundamentalist 
Muslim who prefers American influence over al-Qaeda. At best, a fundamentalist 
dislikes both of them equally. 
We also have to consider the dynamics of the ongoing insurgencies and ask 
the question whether the US and its allies stand a chance to prevail over the al-
Qaeda or Taliban fighters in Afghanistan or al-Qaeda, Baathist and other Islamist 
insurgents in Iraq. On this question, a theory proposed by an American economist 
some 30 years ago supports an extremely bleak prospect. In Tullock’s (1974) view, 
insurgency and counterinsurgency depend less on justice, voluntary support, or 
‘winning hearts and minds’ than on the balance of threats and terror.17 According 
to this theory, most people are individually powerless to significantly affect the 
outcome of an insurgency, but collectively they might nevertheless be decisive. Sin-
ce the actions of resource-poor individuals hardly affect political outcomes, most 
individuals focus on private goals, like survival for themselves and their families. 
16 A closer look at what the US did in Germany after 1945 is not as reassuring as a superficial ap-
proach. Payne (2006b: 212ff.) refers to the ‘harsh treatment of Germans’, ‘deliberately wrecking 
the German economy’, and ‘first punishing, then helping Nazis’. He even asserts that “no posi-
tive measures were needed to keep Nazism from coming back.” If Hitler and his collaborators 
themselves had discredited Nazism, then the nation-building burden on the US would have 
been more bearable. Then democracy could have evolved in Germany rather than having to be 
imposed.
17 Although Tullock (1974) could not take sides or even be aware of the current debate about 
the primacy of either winning ‘hearts and minds’ or applying as much coercion as possible, 
his thinking is obviously close to the coercion school of thought. On the current debate and 
contemporary US campaigns in the Middle East, see Kahl (2007).
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Imagine that the two sides in a civil war – the government and its supporters 
on the one hand and the insurgents on the other hand – differ somewhat in their 
readiness to commit atrocities, to maim, torture and kill on the basis of a mere 
suspicion that one might support the other side. If one’s primary goal is survival, 
or the avoidance of torture, then it is relatively safer to generate the impression 
of sympathizing with the more cruel side. If most ordinary people act as if they 
sympathized with the more cruel side – by providing food, information, or shelter 
for its fighters – then cruelty raises the chances of winning. One might reject this 
argument by pointing to American firepower and readiness to use it with deadly 
effect not only on enemy combatants, but also on bystanders. Even if the Ame-
ricans had killed more innocent bystanders than the insurgents, this would not 
change the decision calculus of those Afghans or Iraqis who are mainly concer-
ned with survival. Americans do not target bystanders who nevertheless might 
be killed. That is why it does not make sense to dissuade them from targeting 
you in the first place.
Unfortunately, this theory has not been rigorously tested. But there is no better 
way to explain the Communist victories in Russia, China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. 
During the civil wars between Communists and their opponents and thereafter, the 
historical record testifies to Communist readiness to kill their suspected enemies 
by the millions. In my reading of the historical record, cruelty and disregarding 
human rights were communist tools of acquiring power (see Rummel 1994 and 
Weede 2000, chapter 4 on China and chapter 10 on Russia). Once in power they 
did not give up what had served them so well in getting there. 
If a contest in cruelty will affect the result of the civil war in Afghanistan or 
Iraq, then the US and any government aligned with it is at a severe disadvantage. 
Nothing in the ideology or history of the Taliban or Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party 
or of Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda prevents them from the application of murde-
rous strategies and techniques, if these are believed to be effective. By contrast, 
no American government can ever order its troops to maim, torture and kill tens 
of thousands of victims – including women and children – on the basis of mere 
suspicion that they might be on the other side without paying a significant pri-
ce. Given a free press at home, no American government could get away with it. 
Nor could an American government afford an ally who makes cruelty and hu-
man rights violations business-as-usual. If an American government ever were 
complicit to an effort to match or exceed the cruelty of the insurgents against 
innocent targets, it would merely lose the war on the home front rather than in 
the theater of war. 
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Admittedly, Tullock’s theory addresses only one out of many determinants of 
success or failure in Afghanistan or Iraq. American readiness to suffer casualties 
and to stay in Iraq seems to run out before the insurgent’s readiness to kill them-
selves and their victims does. If so, then Iraq has become a trap for America. Even 
acknowledging the positive effects of Saddam Hussein’s defeat on Libya’s aban-
donment of its WMD program does not fundamentally change this evaluation. 
Whatever can be done now looks bad. Continuing the war might mean maintai-
ning a school of terrorism, just as Afghanistan was during the Soviet occupation 
and the insurgency against it. Simultaneously, however, American forces in Iraq 
and their local allies might serve as a kind of lightning rod. If American forces 
should be withdrawn, the newly trained terrorists might feel emboldened by the 
belief that Muslim insurgents defeated the US in Iraq after defeating the USSR 
in Afghanistan, and again look for soft targets within the Free World in general 
and America in particular. Moreover, it is dubious whether the West will stay in 
Afghanistan long enough to pacify the country.18 In Afghanistan coalition fatali-
ties may have stabilized below two hundred per year and in Iraq just above eight 
hundred per year (Economist 2007a: 34), but this is not ‘winning’. A double defeat 
or retreat in Iraq and Afghanistan might provide Muslim fundamentalism with 
renewed vigor and self-confidence.
What can be done?
Western efforts at nation-building are attempts to forestall state-failure and the 
export of refugees and political instability to neighboring countries. Although not 
all terrorists are Islamists – think of the Irish Republican Army, or the Basque Eta, 
or the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka – only Islamist terrorism is global in scope. 
It alone killed victims in America and Asia, in Europe and Africa. That is why the 
Bush doctrine and nation-building are focused on the Muslim world rather than 
elsewhere. The geopolitical centrality of the realm of Islam and Western depen-
dence on Middle Eastern oil add to the importance of Muslim countries. 
In the second section of this paper the difficulties of state- and nation-buil-
ding have been outlined, in the third section the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq 
have been analyzed. Both sections have a somewhat ‘defeatist’ flavor. This ana-
lysis seems to contradict the ‘neoconservative’ view (Podhoretz 2007; Muravchik 
2007) diametrically. Actually, however, the neoconservative views that enemies 
18 Scepticism about the chances of pacifying Afghanistan, of state- and nation-building there, 
does not imply the recommendation that Germany or other US allies should admit defeat be-
fore the US does. Maintaining Western unity is more important than most details of policy in 
Afghanistan.
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exist – whether Communists during the Cold War or Muslim fanatics today – that 
they are evil, that they should be fought, that the UN, diplomacy, and foreign aid 
are inefficient tools in the war against them are compatible with the arguments 
made here. Moreover, Germans should be grateful for the neoconservative con-
tribution to the West winning the Cold War.19 The disagreement with the neocon-
servatives is not on the nature of the menace, but on what can be done against 
it. I do not know it. Worse still, my impression is that no one else (neoconserva-
tives included) does. 
There is no guarantee of the existence of easy or politically feasible solutions 
to all problems in international affairs.  Conceivably, state- and nation-building in 
Afghanistan and Iraq might succeed if the West were ready to commit ten times 
as many troops as it currently does for more than two decades. If one works from 
the assumption that current troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq are close to the 
political feasibility frontier, that time or patience in the West is running out, then 
goals should be scaled down. It is obvious that imposing democracy is an even 
more ambitious project than ‘merely’ imposing political stability and providing 
basic security (Etzioni 2007). How difficult even ‘draining the swamp’ of Islamist 
terrorism is, has been clarified by Gordon’s (2007: 54) definition of victory which 
comes “when the ideology the terrorists espouse is discredited, when their tac-
tics are seen to have failed, and when they come to find more promising paths to 
the dignity, respect, and opportunities they crave.” Who knows how to affect the 
terrorist’s minds in this way?20 As infidels (non-Muslims) Westerners should be at 
some disadvantage to influence the Islamists. 
But we should debate even radical solutions. Huntington (1996: 316) once 
advocated an ‘abstention rule’, i.e., he recommended that the US and the West 
should not interfere outside of its own civilization. One may label this ‘non-inter-
ventionism’ or, if one disagrees: ‘isolationism’. But it is not isolationism at the level 
of the nation-state, whether one thinks of the US, the UK, France or Germany. It is 
isolationism at the level of Western civilization and focused on the least tractable 
parts of the underdeveloped world. Thus, the ‘abstention rule’ is compatible with 
Western unity.21 The ‘abstention rule’ permits a compromise between otherwise 
19 Some Germans claim that détente contributed to the mellowing of the Soviet Union and its 
decline. I always found another argument more persuasive according to which the reinforcement 
of the arms race by Reagan and the threat of the strategic defence initiative undermined Soviet 
self-confidence. In this interpretation of events, Jewish intellectuals in the neoconservative 
movement contributed to the establishment of the prerequisites of German reunification.
20 Whether Islamist terrorism is single-headed or hydra-like does not necessarily affect the dif-
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incompatible positions. Whereas neoconservatives (like Podhoretz 2007) helped to 
overcome the ‘evil empire’ of the Soviet Union, but also cheered the US misadven-
tures into Afghanistan and Iraq, the non-interventionist tradition within the US has 
always been aware of the cost of interventionism in civil liberty at home (Higgs 
and Close 2007). Global interventionism and the democratization of the Muslim 
Near and Middle East in particular might necessitate too much subordination of 
free individuals under the state. If individual freedom and limited government are 
the main achievements of Western civilization, then we should not risk too much 
of them at home in order to bring their blessings elsewhere.
Applying the ‘abstention rule’ and transfering a qualified ‘isolationism’ to-
ward the level of Western civilization might be an attractive compromise between 
overextension and global interventionism on the one hand and closing one’s eyes 
to security dilemmas and the necessity of defense on the other hand. As a bloc, 
the West remains viable, defensible, and even dominant for the foreseeable time. 
Huntington (1996: 321) is right in claiming: “Europe and America will hang to-
gether, or hang separately.”
Although the abstention rule would be a decent first rule, we might need 
some exceptions. Etzioni (2007) has advocated a moral foreign policy by arguing 
in favor of military interventions to prevent genocide, but not to export democra-
cy. The massacre of the Tutsi in Rwanda is a case where intervention would have 
been justified according to Etzioni’s criteria, but did not happen. Similarly, Collier 
(2007) puts forward the cheap and efficient British intervention in Sierra Leone 
as a model for the future. Preventing mass murder and genocide might constitute 
exceptions from the general abstention rule. But even the exception might need 
ficulty of overcoming it. According to Ajami (2007: 22), “the distinction between the Islamism 
of al-Qaeda and the ‘secularism’ of the Iraqi regime (under Saddam Hussein, E.W.) is a distinc-
tion without a difference.” Podhoretz (2007) seems to agree. Ajami (2007: 22) also provides a 
provocative, but less than fully persuasive answer to the question of how to change Islamist 
minds: “What happens on the battlefield will settle the great contest. Hearts and minds will 
follow, and mirror, the military outcome.” Even if one accepts this analysis of the menace, it 
does not follow that democratization of the Middle East is the cure. According to Mead (2007: 
164), the Israeli defence establishment does not share the hopes which neoconservatives attach 
to democratization in the Middle East.
21 Like any rule it may be misapplied. Schröder and Chirac used it to undermine Western unity in 
2003. This policy has been incompatible with German national interest which requires sticking 
close to the United States. In the end, Chirac and Schröder overestimated the power potential 
of a United Europe (should European unity ever be achieved). Whenever we feel that we cannot 
meet American expectations of support, modesty is required instead of grandstanding (Baring 
2003; Weede 2005b, 2007).
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the qualification ‘intervention on the cheap’. Otherwise, the US or the West might 
intervene and merely interrupt mass murder and genocide.
Since political instability or state failure is contagious, since refugees might 
pour across international borders, another qualification of the abstention rule might 
be required. If unstable countries or regions are at the doorsteps of the West, as 
Bosnia or Kosovo are, then intervention might be required. Again, however, in-
tervention makes sense only if done with sufficient forces to stabilize the target 
area. Otherwise intervention could easily degenerate into a prelude of building a 
fence, as the Israelis have done in an effort to limit the risk spilling over from the 
Palestinian West bank or Gaza. 
Another and more important challenge to the ‘abstention rule’ concerns the 
rise of threats to the survival of the West. As long as it existed, the Soviet Union 
– Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ – qualified as such a threat. Although the Western strategy 
was limited to containment rather than roll-back, forceful military responses from 
the rearmament of Germany to threats with ‘star wars’ were required to defeat 
the threat. Currently, the question is whether Muslim fundamentalism, al-Qaeda 
or ‘Islamofascism’ constitute a comparable threat.22 Podhoretz (2007) argues that 
it does and justifies the American interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq on these 
grounds. The threat may be serious indeed, although we cannot know yet that it 
proves to be as persistent as the Communist threat was. Possibly, however, mili-
tary misadventures in the Muslim world add to the risks of a clash of civilizations 
rather than reduce it. Certainly, Podhoretz is right in raising the issue. Serious 
challenges to the West exist and might become worse. Probably, the demogra-
phically vital, but economically stagnant Muslim world is a more plausible threat 
than fast growing, but simultaneously graying China. Because of its developmen-
tal success China can be co-opted in a free world, just as Japan and South Korea 
were co-opted before.23
Instead of vain attempts at nation-building in other civilizations the West 
should lead by example, instead of sending troops we should send entrepreneurs, 
investors, and traders. Of course, they should go at their own risk – preferably 
driven by the profit motive rather than by missionary zeal and ill-informed idea-
lism. If Westerners in the Third World are driven by the profit motive, then they 
22 If Osama bin Laden has really linked Muslim collaboration with the West to apostasy (The 
Economist 2007b: 10), then one ought to remember that death is frequently considered to be 
the only just penalty for it. Such views might indeed make a ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington 
1996) or ‘World War IV’ (Podhoretz 2007) inevitable..
23 Ultimately, the idea of co-optation builds on the capitalist peace. My view of it has been pu-
blished elsewhere (Weede 2005a).
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have no choice but to adapt to local circumstances and sensibilities in order to 
satisfy the wants of local consumers. Non-interventionism does not imply lea-
ving the Third World to an ugly fate. The Third World stands a chance. It enjoys 
potential ‘advantages of backwardness’ and opportunities for ‘catch-up growth’. 
By their mere existence prosperous Western societies enjoying the rule of law and 
economic freedom provide a model for latecomers in terms of modernization to 
follow, technologies to borrow, and rich markets to which to export. Most Asian 
countries where most of mankind lives have got the message. That is why poverty 
and even inequality are receding globally (Bhalla 2002; Sala-i-Martin 2007; World 
Bank 2005). Against Muslim terrorism, Huntington’s (1996) abstention rule and 
building fences might be the alternative to an endless and frustrating ‘imperial’ 
campaign of nation-building. 
If one expects the Islamist, or even Islamofascist, challenge of terrorism to 
persist for many decades (Podhoretz 2007), if one doubts the feasibility of further 
preemptive wars after the victors in Iraq found so little evidence of weapons of 
mass destruction there, and if one doubts that the Islamist swamp can be drained 
within less than a generation, then the question still is: What can be done? We 
may look at Israel, to a Western democracy located almost in the middle of the 
realm of Islam. Since the end of the Cold War Israel has been the most endange-
red part of Western civilization. If one relates the number of victims to population 
size, then it has suffered more from Islamist terrorism than anyone else. Winning 
a couple of wars against the Arabs did not suffice to make the country safe. Now, 
the country has built a fence to physically separate the Israelis from their Arab 
challengers in general, and from terrorists in particular.
If bad comes to worst, then all of the West may some day face similar threats 
as Israel has done for a long time. Instead of nation-building out there, we might 
start thinking about disengagement or ‘fences’ – not necessarily physical fences 
because most of the West enjoys some distance from the realm of Islam. But the 
‘abstention rule’ might be a kind of cognitive fence against underestimating the 
cost of exporting democracy there. Obviously, disengagement or ’building fences’ 
implies a more cautious attitude towards Muslim immigration than towards 
Buddhist or Hindu immigration. As these standards of comparison illustrate, this 
argument is neither motivated by racial preferences nor by bigotry. But the topic 
of immigration is beyond the scope of this paper. A less interventionist strategy 
toward the Muslim world might also necessitate some rethinking of energy po-
licies. Possibly, this might lead to a renewed advocacy of nuclear power. But this 
topic is beyond the scope of this paper, too.
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